In this paper individual proofs are integrated into provability logic. Systems of axioms for a logic with operators \A is provable" and \p is a proof of A" are introduced, provided with Kripke semantics and decision procedure. Completeness theorems with respect to the arithmetical interpretation are proved.
Introduction
In 1] and 2] proofs were incorporated into propositional logic by means of labeled modalities. The basic labeled modal logic contains the propositional logic enriched by unary operators 2 p i , i = 0; 1; 2; : : : . This language helps to provide a logical treatment of a rather general situation when we are interested not only to know that a certain statement A is valid, but also have to keep track on some evidences of its validness: 2 p A may stand for \p is a proof of A", \p is a program which computes A", \A has a proof of the complexity p", etc. The language of the provability logic ( 3] ) with the provability operator 2 only, where 2A stands for \A is provable", can not do this job. However, labeled modalities alone fail to express some key principles of provability, e.g. the fact that a set of theorems is closed under modus ponens; it can easily be done with the use of the provability operator by the axiom scheme 2(A ! B) ! (2A ! 2B). current paper (as well as in 4] and 5]) we consider a propositional language, which together with labeled modalities for proofs contains also the \usual" modal operator 2 for provability. In the context of proof interpretations it is probably the minimal adequate language. Here is an example of how the proof operators extend the expressive power of provability logic: because of the Godel Incompleteness Theorems, provability logic cannot either prove or reject the formula :2?, which is a modal equivalent of the consistency statement. But the logic of proofs derives formulas :2 p ?; :2 p 2?, which are natural labeled modal formulations of the unprovability of ?.
The Kripke completeness proofs demonstrate that the basic axioms of the labeled modal logic: 2 p A ! A, 2 p A ! 22 p A and :2 p A ! 2(:2 p A) are compatible with the Kripke semantics. Moreover, the extension of a usual modal logic by these new axioms does not destroy the corresponding Kripke frames.
A labeled modal language L + contains two sorts of variables, p 0 ; p 1 ; : : : (called proof variables) and S 0 ; S 1 ; : : : (called sentence variables), symbol ! for the classical implication, the truth value ? for absurdity (the usual Boolean connectives, and the truth value > for truth are de ned as abbreviations), the usual modality 2, and for each proof variable p i the unary modal operator 2 p i ( ) (labeled modality). The set of formulas of L + is thus generated from the atomic formulas ?; S 0 ; S 1 ; : : : by ! as usual, and by the modal operators as follows: if A is an L + formula, then 2A is an L + formula, if p is a proof variable and A an L + formula, then 2 p A is an L + formula; we call these formulas quasiatomic, or q-atomic for short. In the sequel under a modal formula we understand a formula in the language L + . We use small letters p; q; r; : : : for proof variables, capital letters S; T; : : : for sentence variables and A; B; C; : : : for modal formulas. Let L denote the usual modal language over ?; S 0 ; S 1 ; : : : with the only modality 2, i.e. L is a labeled-modalities-free fragment of L + .
Here we make some adaptation of the common uni cation technique (cf. 6]) to the language L + . Those readers who are familiar with substitutions, most general uni ers, etc., may go directly to the de nition 1.2.
A substitution is a nite set of the form (T 1 A 1 ; : : : T n A n ; q 1 r 1 ; : : : q m r m ); where the T i are distinct sentence variables, the q j are distinct proof variables and each A i is a modal formula other than T i , each r j is a proof variable other than q j . For convenience we say an expression is any modal formula or a proof variable. For E an expression, we write E for the result of simultaneously replacing each occurrence of T i in E by A i and each occurrence of q j in E by r j for every i n, j m. If ; : : :); less any T i A i for which T i A i , and any q j r j for which q j r j , any T 0 i A 0 i ; q j 0 r 0 j for which T 0 i ; q 0 j 2 fT 1 ; : : : ; q 1 ; : : :g. Composition is naturally de ned to satisfy (E ) = E( ) and ( ) = ( ) for any expression E and substitutions ; and .
If X = fE 1 ; : : : E n g is a set of expressions we say a substitution is a uni er for X if E 1 E 2 : : : E n , i.e. X is a singleton. X is said to be uni able if it has a uni er. Below, speaking about the uni cation of B 1 ; : : : ; B n , we'll mean the uni cation of the set fB 1 ; : : : ; B n g. With This substitution is a uni er of this set of equations and clearly it is its most general uni er (mgu), i.e. for any other uni er of this set of equations there exists a substitution such that = . Thus to nd an mgu of a set X of expressions it su ces to transform the associated set of equations into an equivalent one which is solved.
Uni cation Algorithm. Nondeterministically choose from the set of equation an equation of a form below and perform the associated action. In what follows we assume, for short, the Peano Arithmetic PA to be the basic theory for proof and provability predicates. We do not restrict ourselves by considering a priori a speci c proof predicate; the proof logic of such a predicate may depend on occasional details of numerations. However, the logic of the usual G odel proof predicate is axiomatized in Chapter 4. We denote the usual G odel proof predicate as Proof (x; y) and the usual provability predicate as Provable(y), i.e. Provable(y) coincides with 9xProof (x; y). We choose a fairly general de nition of a standard proof predicate; it allows not only proofs as rst argument, but also programs, or other special codes.
On the other hand all speci c provability predicates Pr(y) := 9x Prf (x; y), that we deal with in this paper are (provably in PA) equivalent to the usual one Provable(y). Of course, if Prf (x; y) is a recursive formula and PA`8y(Pr(y) $ Provable(y)); then Prf (x; y) is a standard proof predicate.
1.7 De nition. Let Prf be a standard proof predicate and let be a function which assigns to each proof variable p some n 2 ! and to each sentence variable S a sentence of PA. An arithmetical interpretation is a pair (P rf; ). The arithmetical translation A of a modal formula A under the interpretation is the extension of to all modal formulas by: ? := (0 = 1), p := (p) for a proof variable p, S := (S) for a sentence variable S, ( ) commutes with the Boolean connectives, (2A) := Pr(pA q); 2 In this paper we do not distinguish between the natural number n and its numeral n . As usual, p'q denotes the G odel number of ' 2.5 Theorem. B`A () A holds in all A-sound models. 3 In fact any GL-frame (i.e. transitive reverse well-founded) would t here, but we choose nite trees going directly to a strong form of the Kripke completeness theorem for B which will be useful for the arithmetical completeness proof.
Proof. We will rst prove the Kripke completeness of B ? . 2.6 Lemma. For every modal formula A B ?`A =) A is valid in all models.
Proof. Correctness ((=) follows easily from an observation that (K; ) is a GL frame; the correctness of A4-A6 is immediate by the stability and qre exivity forcing conditions. 2.7 Corollary. :2 p 2? is not derivable in B ? .
Indeed, consider a model K = (K; ; ), where K = fag is a singleton, is thus empty, a 2 p 2?, and none of other atomic and q-atomic formulas is true in K. Clearly, K is a model, because a 2? and thus the q-re exivity property is maintained.
We proceed now with the side \(=" of Lemma 2.6. Note that every X-model can be extended to a model by de ning a 6 ' for each node a 2 K and each atomic and q-atomic formula ' 6 2 X. Under this procedure the stability and q-re exivity forcing conditions are clearly preserved.
We prove now that for every modal formula A and every nite adequate set X containing A B ? 6 A =) there is an X-countermodel for A. Suppose A is a modal formula and B ? 6 A. Let X be a nite adequate set containing A, D 0 = 2 q 0 A 0 ; : : : ; D n = 2 qn A n be the list of all q-atomic formulas of X, and let T 0 ; : : : ; T n be sentence variables not occurring in X. To every B 2 X we associate an L-formula B t such that B is the result of substituting all those occurrences of D i which are not in scopes of any labeled modalities for T i throughout B t for all i with 0 i n. Thus Let then for some x 2 K x 0 2 q i A i . Then regardless to x = a or x 6 = a we have x T i ! A t i , x 0 2 q i A i ! A i , and x 0 A i .
To complete the proof of Lemma 2.6 assume that B ? 6 A. Take the set of all subformulas of A as an adequate set X, get an X-countermodel for A and then extend this X-model to a countermodel of A by putting all atomic and q-atomic formulas not from X to be false at each node. Lemma 2.6 is proved.
2.9 Corollary. B ? enjoys the nite model property and thus B ? is decidable.
2.10 Remark. The proof of the Kripke style completeness for B ? provides e ectively a nite set of \possible countermodels" to A. This gives an upper bound on the computational time for a decision procedure of order 2 cn , with n the length of the formula, and c xed.
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 2.5, direction (=)). After the correctness of B ? we have only to verify that if A is obtained by R3 rule from 2A, which is valid in all 2A-sound models, then A is valid in all A-sound models. Suppose A is false at some node of an A-sound model K = (K; ; ) with the root node a. We construct a new model K 0 = (K 0 ; 0 ; 0 ) by adding the new root node b (i.e. K 0 = K fbg; b 0 x 2 K and 0 = on K), and de ning for every atomic and q-atomic formula Q b 0 Q () Q 2 SbA and a Q:
Now 0 has only one extension from atomic and q-atomic formulas to all modal formulas, satisfying forcing conditions 1 and 2; we have to check now that this extension satis es 3 and 4 as well. Everything is clear with the stability condition. Note that 0 coincides with on K, and thus q-re exivity holds at each node of K 0 but, may be, the root node b. ((=). Let B 6 A. Take X = SbA as a nite adequate set. Let also K = (K; ; ) be an A-sound SbA-model such that A is false at some node of K. We assume that K = f1; : : : ; ng and 1 is the root node. As in 3] we de ne a new model K 0 by adding a node 0 to K, putting 0 i (1 i n), and de ning 0 Q i 1 Q for every atomic and q-atomic formula Q 2 SbA. otherwise put h(m + 1) = h(m), where \l = j" is a natural arithmetical formula for \j is a limit of h(t)".
We also assume that the following Solovay lemma holds:
2.14 Lemma. ( 3]) 1. PA`\0 l n"; 2. \l = 0" is true, but each of the theories PA + \l = i" is consistent for i = 0; 1 : : : ; n; 3. PA + \l = i"`Provable(p\l 6 = i"q); i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; 4. PA + \l = i"`:Provable(p\l 6 = j"q); i = 0; 2; : : : ; n; i j; 5. PA + \l = i"`:Provable(p\l = j"q); i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; i 6 j.
In order to de ne an arithmetical interpretation = (P rf; ') we rst introduce ' for proof and sentence variables occurring in SbA: It is easy to see now that Prf (u; v) is a primitive recursive formula and that the interpretation is injective. We will demonstrate that Prf we are done: PA`\l = k" ! G :
for some j k j 6 H; by the induction hypothesis PA`\l = k" ! :H ;
PA`H ! \l 6 = j";
PA`Provable(pH q) ! Provable(p\l 6 = j"q); PA`:Provable(p\l 6 = j"q) ! :Provable (pH q); but by 2.14 (4) PA`\l = k" ! :Provable (p\l 6 = j"q);
thus PA`\l = k" ! :Provable (pH q):
But Pr(y) may di er from Provable(y) only on the G odel numbers of the qatomic formulas from the xed nite set T; every formula from T is valid in each node of the model K 0 , thus H 6 2 T, and PA`Pr(pH q) ! Provable(pH q): Finally, we have got the desired PA`\l = k" ! :Pr (pH q), i.e. By 2.14 (1) PA`\0 j n", and thus PA`H ; PA`Provable(pH q), and PA`\l = 0" ! G . If 0 6 2H, then for some j > 0 j 6 H, by the previous induction PA`\l = j" ! :H , PA`H ! \l 6 = j", PA`Provable(pH q) ! Provable(p\l 6 = j"q); PA`:Provable(p\l 6 = j"q) ! :Provable (pH q); but by 2.14 (4) PA`\l = 0" ! :Provable (p\l 6 = j"q);
thus PA`\l = 0" ! :Provable (pH q):
The same argument as above shows that The nal steps of the proof of the theorem are standard. As A 2 SbA and k 6 A for some k 2 K, we have PA`\l = k" ! :A ;
PA`A ! :\l = k": Suppose PA`A , then PA`:\l = k", which contradicts Lemma 2.14 (2). 3.6 Corollary. F ? enjoys a nite model property.
It doesn't give us, however, a decision algorithm for F ? directly. A forcing relation in a model is not inductively de ned, and even a nite countermodel for A requires a priori a check of the functionality axiom A7, which involves arbitrary formulas D; E, not only subformulas of A. We still have to show how to extend a partial forcing relation de ned on the subformulas of A to a real forcing relation on all formulas.
For a modal formula A and a frame (K; ) let x 0 B be a relation de ned on the nodes x 2 K and on B 2 SbA. We assume that 0 satis es forcing conditions 1-4; as none of these conditions refers to any formula other than from SbA, there is a clear algorithm which for a given A, (K; ), and 0 decides whether the forcing conditions 1-4 are ful lled. Below, while dealing with stable (partial) forcing relations we will write Q instead of x Q for a Boolean combination Q of q-atomic formulas.
We describe now decidable necessary and su cient conditions for A, (K; ), and 0 , which in addition to 1-5 guarantee that 0 can be extended to a real forcing relation on the frame (K; ). Let V be the following algorithm which starts with a frame (K; ), a relation 0 de ned for x 2 K; G 2 SbA satisfying forcing conditions 1-4 for all subformulas of A.
Step 0: Y 0 := SbA; 0 := the empty substitution ,
Step i Then on the basis of the forcing conditions 1-2, we may infer that for all x 2 K x 2(2 p B&2 p C) ! (2D ! 2E);
but the stability of gives x (2 p B&2 p C) =) x 2(2 p B&2 p C);
and we are done.
3.10 Lemma. (K; ; ) is a countermodel for A. Proof. As is a forcing relation extending 0 , and ( 0 ) 6 0 A we conclude that ( 0 ) 6 A.
3.11 Corollary. F ? is decidable.
Proof. Now together with the nite model property for F ? we have an algorithm, which for a given nite frame and a given partial forcing relation de ned on the nodes of this frame and on the subformulas of a given formula decides whether there exists a model extending this partial forcing relation. It provides a recursive enumeration of all nite models and thus all non-theorems of F ? ; by the standard Post argument F ? is decidable. Again, the proof of the Kripke style completeness for F ? provides e ectively a nite set of \possible countermodels" to A. This gives an upper bound on the computational time for a decision procedure of order 2 cn , with n the length of the formula, and c xed.
Now we procced with the proof of Theorem 3.2. Direction ((=) is treated exactly as the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 2.5. Suppose F 6 A and let N be the cardinality of Z = f2B j 2B 2 SbAg. Then F ? 6 2 N+1 A and we take a countermodel K = (K; ; ) to the formula 2 N+1 A. Then there is a sequence of nodes a 0 a 1 : : : a N+1 such that a i :2 N+1?i A, with 0 i N + 1, in particular a N+1 6 A. None of the formulas 2B ! B (2B 2 Z) can be false at two di erent nodes a i and a j . So, by the pigeonhole principle there is an i (0 i N + 1) such that a i H(A):
As soon as a i a N+1 or a i = a N+1 the restriction K 0 of the model K to the set of its nodes fb j a i b or a i = bg is the desired model. Direction (=)) of Theorem 3.2. We'll get this correctness statement for granted after the proof of the arithmetical completeness of F as an easy corollary of the arithmetical correctness of F and the fact that for a given countermodel for A one may construct an arithmetical interpretation under which A is not provable in PA (Theorem 3.14). It is di cult however not to try the machinery of Kripke models for F already developed above. So here is a draft proof of the Kripke model correctness of F .
Induction on the derivability in F as in Theorem 2.5, direction (=)). The only nontrivial part is the step corresponding to the R3 rule: let A be obtained from 2A by R3, and suppose there is a countermodel K = (K; ; ) for A with H(A) valid at its root node a. Add Then we prove that any failure of V on K 0 , SbA would mean a relevant failure of V on K; SbA, which is impossible as soon as K is a functional model. Indeed, there might be 3 sorts of reasons for V to fail on K 0 , SbA. ?`2N+1 A; where N is the cardinality of Z = f2B j 2B 2 SbAg. As 2 N+1 A is not longer than the double length of A the upper bound of the complexity of F is also of order 2 cn , with n the length of the formula, and c xed.
It turns out that the existence of a substitution which makes SbA functional and preserves the truth values of all subformulas of A in a given model is essential not only for Kripke semantics of F , but also will play a key role in the arithmetic completeness proof for F . Proof. In addition to what we have already proven we should check only that (H(A)) = H(A ), which easily follows from the de nitions and the observation that (SbA) = Sb(A ).
3.2 The arithmetical completeness of F 3.14 Theorem. Proof. Look at the arithmetical interpretation as at a substitution in a language which combines L + and PA languages. Then is a uni er of B; C modulo 2 minor details both being irrelevant to our case. ((=). Let F 6 A. By 3.13 take a substitution and a nite A -sound functional countermodel K for A such that (SbA) is functional in K. We assume that K = f1; : : : ; ng and 1 is the root node. Again we de ne a new model K 0 by adding a node 0 to K, putting 0 i (1 i n), and de ning 0 B i 1 B for every formula B 2 SbA . For our purposes it is su cient to have de ned at the nodes of K 0 and on SbA only and not to bother about a consistent extension of to all modal formulas (that however can be done).
It is clear that satis es forcing conditions 1-5 on SbA at the node 0 as well: where \l = j" is a natural arithmetical formula for \j is a limit of h(t)".
We also assume that the Solovay Lemma 2.14 holds. We will nish now the proof of the Theorem 3.14: as i 6 4 Logic of the G odel proof predicate Let us return to the example of the formula :2 p :2 p ?, which is false under some functional interpretation . In fact this formula is true (and provable in PA) under each interpretation based on the usual G odel proof predicate Proof (x; y). The reason for it is that the usual G odel numbering is provably monotone in a sense that the G odel number of a proof is greater, than the G odel numbers of formulas from this proof, the G odel number of a formula is greater, than the G odel number of any term from this formula, the G odel number of a numeral n is greater, than n itself.
De nition.
A functional interpretation is called G odel interpretation if it is based on the G odel proof predicate Proof (x; y).
In this chapter we prove that the logic M is complete with respect to all G odel interpretations. A "naive" question arises, what is the usual G odel proof predicate? There are di erent styles of G odel numbering and syntactically many di erent ways to write Proof (x; y). Fortunately we may skip this question because the language L + does not distinguish these proof predicates; moreover, the logic M is complete for every single functional proof predicate for which the axiom of monotonicity A8 is correct. 4 A is valid in all monotone A-sound models
The proof of this theorem also almost typographically repeats that of Theorem 3.2. One has only to incorporate the monotonicity condition into the de nition of a model. As in 3.2 we de ne the axiom system M ? as M without the liberalization rule R3, and prove the completeness of M ? with respect to nite tree functional models with the monotonicity forcing condition 6. This condition also doesn't spoil the algorithm V ; we should only insert a monotonicity checker to work on each step of V . Let V succeed on a frame (K; ) with a partial forcing relation 0 de ned on (K; ) and SbA, terminates after k steps with a resulting substitution = 0 1 k and a resulting partial forcing relation k satisfying forcing conditions 1-6 for SbA , and SbA functional for (K; k ).
As before we de ne the forcing relation on (K; ) rst for atomic and We proceed now with the proof of the completeness (i.e. the direction (=), which also includes the Solovay construction for 2 steps of the induction, but is totally di erent from that for F in \labeled modalities" part. Let M 6 A. By 4.6 take a substitution and a nite A -sound monotone countermodel K for A such that (SbA) = Sb(A ) is functional in K. As before we assume that K = f1; : : : ; ng and 1 is the root node and de ne a new model K 0 by adding a node 0 to K, putting 0 i (1 i n), and de ning 0 B i 1 B for every formula B 2 SbA . It is clear that as in 3.14 the relation satis es forcing conditions 1-6 on SbA at the node 0 as well. Now for the model K 0 and for the usual G odel proof predicate Proof (x; y) we de ne a Solovay function h(t); \l = j" as a natural arithmetical formula for \j is a limit of h(t)", and put '(S i ) := _ j S i \l = j"]^i = i:
We begin a process of de ning the interpretation ] = (P roof; ') (i.e. de ning the interpretation of proof variables Let us now make a step from k to k + 1. (1) Finally, as in 3.14 we conclude that PA 6 
